Public Law: Professional Responsibility by Knight, Richard F.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 40 | Number 3
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1978-1979 Term: A Symposium
Spring 1980
Public Law: Professional Responsibility
Richard F. Knight
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Richard F. Knight, Public Law: Professional Responsibility, 40 La. L. Rev. (1980)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol40/iss3/16
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Richard F. Knight*
Practicing attorneys can no longer safely resolve matters of pro-
fessional responsibility through the application of traditional rules
that were once thought to be absolute and inviolate. Recent deci-
sions involving such matters as advertising, group legal services,
and solicitation are but some examples of rapid changes which are
taking place in the area of professional responsibility. Compound
this with a significant increase in the number of lawyers being ad-
mitted to the bar, and it is not surprising that the courts are con-
fronted with an increasing number of cases involving matters of pro-
fessional responsibility.
Louisiana is no exception to this trend. During the last year, the
Louisiana Supreme Court handed down decisions involving discipli-
nary action resulting from such matters as the conviction of crime
and the commingling of a client's funds. The court was also faced
with questions concerning advertising and solicitation. Due to the
growth of the legal profession and the public's right to receive
competent services, the burden will become even greater upon the
court to set the tone for standards of professional conduct which
will be clearly understood by members of the bar. In like manner,
the court must furnish the bar with sufficient guidance as to mat-
ters of professional responsibility and must be prepared to impose
sufficient sanctions to insure compliance. The purpose of these sanc-
tions, as courts have often observed, is not to punish the attorney so
much as to protect the public. At times it appears that the supreme
court's compassion for an individual attorney found guilty of profes-
sional impropriety has resulted in judicial language which does not
further the objective of the court and the bar in striving to improve
the level of professional competence and professional responsibility.
In the final analysis, however, the decisions are a clear message to
the bar. The court will not countenance professional irresponsibility
and will look with a special disfavor upon those fundamental
breaches of professional responsibility, such as the commingling of a
client's funds and other basic violations of the disciplinary rules con-
tained in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
*Member, Louisiana State Bar Association.
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DISCIPLINARY ACTION
Conviction of Crime
The supreme court decided in Louisiana State Bar Association
v. Batson' that an attorney acquitted of a crime may still be found
guilty of professional impropriety with regard to the same incident.
The respondent, a former attorney for the State Department of
Revenue, had been acquitted of charges brought against him relat-
ing to the alleged misappropriation of funds. Nevertheless, the court
found by clear and convincing evidence (a lesser standard than that
required for a criminal conviction) that the attorney was guilty of
professional impropriety on the same facts upon which he had been
acquitted of a crime.' As a result, the respondent was suspended for
six months.
Under the Louisiana State Bar Association Articles of Incorpora-
tion, 3 the certificate of the conviction of the attorney is conclusive
evidence of his guilt of the crime for which he has been convicted.
The respondent in Batson argued that because this makes a criminal
conviction conclusive proof of misconduct, an acquittal must consti-
tute conclusive proof that there has been no misconduct.' To hold
otherwise would violate the due process and equal protection
clauses of the federal Constitution, he alleged The court disagreed,
holding that, under section 8 of article XV of the Articles of Incor-
poration, an acquittal is to be given equal weight regarding the inno-
cence of the crime for which the attorney had been acquitted.' The
court applied its own emphasis to the word "crime."7 Whether an at-
torney has been found guilty or innocent in a criminal court of this
state does not mean he will receive the same result in a disciplinary
proceeding. The attorney's "moral fitness to practice law" is the
issue to be decided. A verdict of guilty is conclusive evidence of the
guilt of the crime and usually of the unfitness to remain a practicing
lawyer. A verdict of acquittal, however, is conclusive evidence of the
innocence of the crime, but not the fitness to practice law.
One must recognize the logic of this result. The court, when
functioning as a disciplinarian, is concerned with the attorney's pro-
fessional conduct and must decide whether that conduct is inappro-
1. 359 So. 2d 70 (La. 1978).
2. Id at 73.
3. ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, LOUISIANA STATE BAR Ass'N art. XV, § 8(7)(c), LA.
R.S. 37, ch. 4 app. (Supp. 1971) [hereinafter cited as ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION].
4. 359 So. 2d at 72.
5. Id
6. lId
7. Id, citing ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, supra note 3.
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priate under the Code of Professional Responsibility, not whether he
performed all of the elements of a crime outlined in the Criminal
Code.
The same rationale was followed by the supreme court in the
disbarment proceedings brought against an attorney convicted of in-
fluencing a criminal juror in federal court. In Louisiana State Bar
Association v. Thierry,8 the respondent attempted to show by means
of character witnesses and his own testimony that he was morally
fit to practice law, although he admitted his guilt of the crime. He
asserted that he had been overzealous and naive about criminal mat-
ters, which did not make him morally unfit. The court rejected these
arguments and, while confessing compassion for the respondent, held
that "without a firm attitude in these matters, this Court would be un-
true to its obligation and responsibility to maintain and uphold the
high ethical standards of the profession of law and the administra-
tion of justice."9 The court revoked the attorney's license effective
September 4, 1975, the date of the respondent's initial suspension,
pursuant to section 8(4) of article XV of the Articles of Incorpora-
tion. The court's decision was dated December 15, 1978. Presumably
the court made the revocation effective in 1975 in order to grant to
the respondent the benefit of the time elapsed between the original
suspension and the court's final decision toward the calculation of
the minimum of five years he must wait before petitioning for
reinstatement.
In two additional cases, the court also found that the crime for
which the attorney was convicted indicated his moral unfitness.
Louisiana State Bar Association v. Adams1" involved disciplinary
proceedings brought against a salaried attorney for Charity Hospi-
tal. He was convicted of accepting a bribe from a prospective lessee
of a service station owned by the hospital. The court found this
crime reflected so seriously upon the young lawyer's moral fitness
to practice law that disbarment was the required disciplinary action.
The disbarment was made effective as of the date of the relator's
suspension from the practice of law, as in the Thierry case.
In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Quaid," a member of the
Louisiana bar who had been convicted of burglary in Georgia,
sought to return to the practice of law in this state after he had
completed his prison sentence. The court decided that the felony for
which he had been convicted was "so serious that it casts doubt on
8. 366 So. 2d 1305 (La. 1978).
9. Id.. at 1307.
10. 363 So. 2d 418 (La. 1978).
11. 368 So. 2d 1043 (La. 1979).
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his ability to loyally represent his clients, and indicates a disregard
of ethical standards which reflects his lack of moral fitness for the
practice of law."12 As a result, he was disbarred, effective the date
of the court's order of suspension.
The supreme court in Louisiana State Bar Association v.
Philips'13 found that the seriousness of the crime of which the attor-
ney is convicted may outweigh mitigating circumstances. The attor-
ney pled guilty to a charge of theft of money from his client; the
Court found that such a theft violated disciplinary rule 9-102."'
Although the facts in the case indicated that the attorney had made
attempts at restitution, the court pointed out that restitution only
began after it became apparent that an audit would occur. The
court also noted that the respondent never expressed any regret
over his "continued pattern of spurious settlements that harmed
both the injured claimants and the attorneys representing them." 5
The attorney was disbarred.
Commingling Clients' Funds
The mingling of a client's money with that of the attorney is a
serious charge and was the basis, in part, for at least two of the dis-
ciplinary actions already mentioned."6 The supreme court disciplined
three attorneys in the last term for the improper handling of their
clients' funds. None were disbarred, however, although disbarment
is the usual remedy for such a charge." The discipline imposed was
limited to suspensions due to mitigating factors which supported
each attorney's fitness to practice law.
In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Adams, 8 an attorney who
spent most of his time as a realtor was charged with retaining funds
which were supposed to be used to pay off a mortgage. The attorney
handled a real estate closing in 1976 and received a cash payment
for the home. Instead of using the cash to pay off the vendor's first
mortgage, the attorney kept the money and put at least $25,000 to
his own use. He made the prescribed monthly payments on the ven-
dor's mortgage, and four and one-half months later paid off the loan.
12. Id at 1045.
13. 363 So. 2d 667 (La. 1978).
14. Id at 669, citing ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, supra note 3, at art. XVI, D.R.
9-102.
15. 363 So. 2d at 670.
16. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Philips, 363 So. 2d 667 (La. 1978); Louisiana State
Bar Ass'n v. Batson, 359 So. 2d 70 (La. 1978).
17. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Stinson, 368 So. 2d 971, 973 (La. 1979).
18. 368 So. 2d 694 (La. 1979).
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The court found that the respondent misused his client's funds, an
act which "represents a grave form of professional misconduct.'"' In
mitigation, the court found that the respondent never intended to
appropriate the money permanently, had voluntarily suspended him-
self from the practice of law, and had expressed his intent not to
practice law in the future. The court therefore suspended him for
only one year."0
The supreme court in Louisiana State Bar Association v. Stin-
son" found a 64-year-old attorney guilty of procrastination and with-
holding a client's funds. The attorney was accused of unjustified
delay and neglect in the handling of certain cases, neglect and
failure to prepare for a specified trial, and commingling and use of
clients' funds. The court found that the attorney
did good and honest work for his clients (if slowly); that no client
lost money by his actions (nor is there the slightest hint of dis-
honest intent in the lawyer's procrastination); that indeed of his
own volition (before any bar complaint) in each instance he at-
tempted to minimize any client loss occasioned by his own delay
by cutting his fees, which were in any event minimal rather than
excessive; and that the lawyer had attempted to rectify his
negligence or delay before any complaint was made to the disci-
plinary authorities.'
The respondent was suspended for three years instead of being dis-
barred by the supreme court which, the court recognized, is the
usual penalty for the commingling of clients' funds to the extent
"here indicated. 23
Finally, in Louisiana State Bar Association v. Rivette' an attor-
ney was found to have mingled the funds of a client, who was a per-
sonal friend, with his own. The court agreed with the commissioner
that "friends and relatives are entitled to the same high standards
of integrity from their attorney as are strangers. 12 5 The court, ap-
parently persuaded by the fact that the respondent expressed his in-
tention to "limit his future practice to that of a salaried government
employee who would not have the responsibility for receiving, ac-
counting for, and repaying clients' funds,"' suspended the attorney
19. Id at 696.
20. Id
21. 368 So. 2d 971 (La. 1979).
22. Id. at 973.
23. Id. at 974.
24. 368 So. 2d 1045 (La. 1979).
25. Id at 1047.
26. Id
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for only one year. The attorney was also accused of accepting a fee
from a client and then failing to perform the work. Although there
was disagreement about the facts of the matter, the commissioner
and the court found that the facts were more consistent with the
client's version than the attorney's. 7 The respondent was repri-
manded and ordered to return the money to the client. 8
Mitigating Factors
. In many disciplinary proceedings, "mitigating factors" or, more
appropriately, evidence of the attorney's good character may mean
the difference between a relatively short suspension and a long
suspension or a disbarment. Although it is not possible to articulate
definitively just what factors influence the court, and to what
degree, there does appear to be some pattern in the decisions.
Attempts by the attorney to correct the error
If an attorney has appropriated or used his client's money, resti-
tution will work in his favor. The court has viewed the situation
more favorably for the attorney if the attorney has returned the
money before any complaint is filed. For example, in Rivette the
court noted that repayment of the funds was a factor in mitigation,
but that such should not be given great weight when repayment is
accomplished only after the institution of formal charges by the Bar
Association. 9 The same was true in Philips." On the other hand, the
court noted with favor in Adams that the money was repaid before
a complaint was filed with either the local Bar Association or the
local realtors' board.' The way the money is replaced also may
make a difference. In Batson the money was returned in an irregu-
lar manner, a fact which the court noticed.2 2
Length of practice
The length of time that a lawyer has been actively practicing
may be considered. An attorney may argue that he was naive about
the situation because he had not been practicing very long. This
argument was unsuccessful in the Thierry case, probably due to the
fact that Mr. Thierry had been a member of the bar for four years
27. Id at 1048.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1047.
30. 363 So. 2d at 670.
31. 368 So. 2d at 696.
32. 359 So. 2d at 73.
734 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
at the time of his indiscretion." He also attempted to argue that he
had insufficient experience in one type of law, criminal practice to
realize his conduct was improper. The court refused to give much
weight to that argument.
. On the other hand, Mr. Stinson had been practicing law for some
forty-two years at the time the court decided his case . 3 The Court
noted the respondent's age, good reputation during his long practice
of law, public service, and his honorable position as a community
leader. As the court observed, a lesser disciplinary penalty was not
justified because of these facts. In fact, the court suggested that
"perhaps the converse is true.""
Self-imposed penalty
The supreme court may also consider an attorney's own attempt
to preclude the future occurrence of the situation for which he was
disciplined. In Adams, the respondent spent most of his time in the
real estate business and voluntarily suspended himself from the
practice of law. 7 The court noted this fact, along with his intention
not to practice law in the future. 8 In Rivette the attorney had quit
private practice and had a position as a salaried government em-
ployee. 8 He would not have the responsibility for receiving, account-
ing for, and repaying clients' funds." This apparently influenced
both the State Bar Association and the court in limiting his penalty
to suspension.'
Other extenuating circumstances
The court noted in these cases, among other things, severe emo-
tional and financial disasters suffered by the lawyer; 2 the lack of
any other complaints lodged against the attorney;'3 reliance on
another attorney;" the lack of regret for his acts by the attorney;'
5
33. 366 So. 2d at 1307.
34. Id.
35. 368 So. 2d at 974.
36. Id.
37. 368 So. 2d at 696.
38. I&
39. 368 So. 2d at 1047.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Adams, 363 So. 2d at 419.
43. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Batson, 359 So. 2d at 73.
44. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Adams, 363 So. 2d at 419.
45. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Philips, 363 So. 2d at 670.
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his education; 6 whether he is a single practitioner;' 7 and, of course,
the lack of an intent to do anything wrong.'
8
Practice as a Notary Public After Disbarment
Louisiana Revised Statutes 35:14 provides that any attorney
who is disbarred or suspended may not act as a notary public for
the same period that he cannot practice law.'9 In State ex rel.
Wootan,5" a suspended attorney tested the constitutionality of this
law but failed in his attempt to have it struck down. The alleged
crime for which the attorney had been suspended occurred before
the enactment of the statute. Judge Samuel of the fourth circuit
refused to rule this a violation of the constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws." The suspension of the attorney occurred
after the statute had been enacted; and the court decided that this
was the date to be considered.52 The court also refused to find any
violations of the equal protection clause, because the services of
notaries in a civil law jurisdiction are often the same as those per-
formed by attorneys. The legislature had a reasonable basis to pre-
vent a suspended or disbarred attorney from doing indirectly what
he could not do directly."
ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION
The Louisiana Supreme Court was confronted with resolving the
propriety of attorney solicitation by mail in Allison v. Louisiana
State Bar Association.' Two New Orleans attorneys unsuccessfully
sought to have the advertising of prepaid legal service plans ruled
46. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Thierry, 366 So. 2d at 1307.
47. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Stinson, 368 So. 2d at 974.
48. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Adams, 368 So. 2d at 696.
49. LA. R.S. 35:14 (Supp. 1976) provides:
Any attorney at law, or person who was an attorney at law, who is disbarred
or suspended from the practice of law due to charges filed by the Committee on
Professional Responsibility of the Louisiana State Bar Association or who has con-
sented to disbarment shall not be qualified or eligible nor shall he exercise any
functions as a notary public in any parish of the state of Louisiana as long a& he
remains disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in Louisiana. Provided,
however, that nothing in this Section shall apply to any action taken against an
attorney at law for failure to pay annual dues.
50. 364 So. 2d 1079 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 provides: "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto
Law shall be passed."
52. 364 So. 2d at 1081.
53. Id. at 1081-82.
54. 362 So. 2d 489 (La. 1978).
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constitutional, basing their claim on NAACP v. Button" and its
progeny.
The plaintiffs, who at that time were in practice together, had
mailed letters offering prepaid legal services plans to employers in
the New Orleans area. After being notified of an investigation into
the incident, the pair sued in the supreme court to stop the Loui-
siana State Bar Association, maintaining that sections of the Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibiting such activity had a chilling
effect on their first and fourteenth amendment rights."
The court held that solicitations for employment which are not
for pecuniary gain are permissible. However, solicitations which
have as their primary basis an economic benefit for the attorneys
are forbidden. In so deciding, the court looked at United States
Supreme Court decisions on the subject. Button, the court found,
upheld the rights of the NAACP staff to assist those with potential
legal actions raising questions of racial discrimination. The Supreme
Court noted the lawful objectives of the group and found that "asso-
ciation for litigation may be the most effective form of political
association." '57
In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia,58 the Supreme
Court also upheld solicitation where it concerned an organization not
involved in the advancement of civil rights. The court found that
solicitation by a union of legal assistance for its members is not "am-
bulance chasing." The railroad workers, by recommending compe-
tent lawyers to each other, are not themselves practicing law nor
are they or the lawyers whom they select parties to any solicitation
of business.59 In United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Associa-
tion,8" the court stated that the goals of the organization providing
the legal assistance need not be political to come under the Button
decision. As the Court pointed out, the grievances for which the
right of petition and assembly were insured are not solely religious
or political ones. Great secular causes, with small ones, are
guarded."
Although these cases arguably support the position of the two
attorneys in Allison, the state court based its decision primarily
on two 1978 United States Supreme Court companion cases which
55. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
56. 362 So. 2d at 490.
57. 371 U.S. at 431.
58. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
59. Id at 6-7.
60. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
61. Id. at 223, citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945).
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dealt directly with attorney solicitation. In the first, Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Association,"2 the attorney, having heard of an automobile
accident, visited both of the victims, informed them of their poten-
tial legal rights, and solicited employment. Although recognizing
that commercial speech is due some first amendment protection,
the Court nonetheless held that in-person solicitations are dangerous
because they may exert pressure and often demand an immediate
response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or reflec-
tion. Persons needing counsel should engage in critical comparison
of the availability, nature, and prices of legal services. 3 In-person
solicitation does not allow this and, therefore, "may disserve the in-
dividual and societal interest . . . in facilitating 'informed and reli-
able decisionmaking.""' Therefore, the state could regulate such in-
person solicitation.6
In the second case, In re Primus," the United States Supreme
Court upheld the actions of an attorney for the American Civil
Liberties Union in contacting women who had been sterilized or
threatened with sterilization as a condition of their continued par-
ticipation in a "Medicaid" program and offering them legal services.
The Court quickly differentiated this case from Ohralik, its compan-
ion. 7 The situation in Primus was not in-person solicitation for
pecuniary gain, but communication of an offer of free assistance by
ACLU attorneys. The latter is acceptable according to the Supreme
Court.
The Louisiana Supreme Court found that the Allison situation
fell under the classification of solicitation for pecuniary gain. The
fact that the offer was by mail, rather than in-person, did not make
enough difference to avoid the conclusion reached in Ohralik,
although the court itself had noted that solicitation by mail does not
present the dangers which are found in personal offers. 9 Because
the court could find no constitutional rights involved, except those
of the attorneys, even though the Trainmen and UMW cases had ex-
tended some constitutional protections in this area, the prohibition
against direct solicitation by lawyers for pecuniary gain was
upheld."0 Former Justice Albert Tate concurred in the result,
62. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
63. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
64. 436 U.S. at 458, citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
65. Id. at 464.
66. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
67. Id. at 434.
68. 362 So. 2d at 496.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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although he felt that solicitation might be accepted under further
decisions of the United States Supreme Court. 1
ATTORNEY'S FEES
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal ruled in Calk v. Highland
Construction & Manufacturing, Inc."2 that an attorney does not have
a special privilege for his fee when the suit is settled and no judg-
ment on the merits is rendered. The court based its decision on
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5001,11 which allows a special privilege
for fees on "all judgments" obtained by attorneys and on the prop-
erty recovered as a result. Under this statute the special privilege
would prime all other privileges.
The court decided that the language of Revised Statutes 9:5001
refers only to the granting of a first privilege on judgments. Be-
cause the statute does not mention "compromises," and because pro-
visions granting privileges must be strictly construed, the statute
was not held to grant a special privilege on settlements obtained
without a judgment." Two judges dissented, deciding that a compro-
mise was a judgment. 5
The same court, in Oliver v. Doga,6 decided a few days after
Calk, ruled that an attorney's contingency fee contract concerning a
partition of community property is void if executed while the par-
ties are still married. The wife entered into the contract with the at-
torney after the judicial separation but before the divorce. After the
couple divorced in 1975, they were remarried, apparently before
there was any partition of the community. In 1977 the pair divorced
again, and the community was partitioned. The attorney sought to
enforce his rights under the earlier contract as allowed by Louisiana
Revised Statutes 37:218." The court disagreed, citing Aucoin v.
71. 362 So. 2d at 497 (Tate, J., concurring).
72. 368 So. 2d 1100 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
73. LA. R.S. 9:5001 (1950) provides: "A special privilege is hereby granted to at-
torneys at law for the amount of their professional fees on all judgments obtained by
them, and on the property recovered thereby, either as plaintiff or defendant, to take
rank as a first privilege thereon."
74. 368 So. 2d at 1101.
75. 368 So. 2d at 1102-03 (Foret, J., dissenting); 368 So. 2d at 1103 (Stoker, J., dis-
senting).
76. 368 So. 2d 467 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
77. LA. R.S. 37:218 (1950) provides:
By written contracts signed by the client, attorneys at law may acquire as their
fee an interest in the subject matter of the suit, proposed suit, or claim in the
prosecution or defense of which they are employed, whether the suit or claim be
for money or for property. In such a contract for employment, it may be stipu-
lated that neither the attorney nor the client may, without the written consent of
[Vol. 40
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Williams"' as support for its decision that the contract was void as
against public policy. The contract could have hindered a reconcilia-
tion between the parties, the court decided, although in this case it
did not stop the pair from getting back together the first time.7 ' The
court also ruled that the attorney did not have a special privilege
under Revised Statutes 9:5001.0 Because the contract, though re-
corded, was void, the attorney had failed to file an affidavit or other
notice of the privilege in the mortgage or suit records, he could not
enforce his privilege against third-parties; therefore, the attorney's
consent was not required for the cancellation of the judgment.81
The fourth circuit in Singleton v. Bunge Corp."2 also required the
recordation of the contingency fee contract when the clients and the
attorney disagreed over whether consent had been given for a set-
tlement. The attorney had stated in court that his clients, husband
and wife, had reached a settlement in a tort case. The trial court
had proceeded with the case without those clients. The couple had
later contended that they had not consented to the settlement as re-
quired by Revised Statutes 37:218"3 and that, therefore, the settle-
ment did not affect them. The fourth circuit disagreed. Contingency
fee contracts must be recorded to have effect against third parties.
Furthermore, an attorney's oral confession of compromise in court is
binding under the provisions of Civil Code article 2291."' A judicial
confession is full proof against the party making it. 5 Therefore, the
couple could not contest the settlement agreement.8
the other, settle, compromise, release, discontinue or otherwise dispose of the suit
or claim. Either party to the contract may, at any time, file it with the clerk of
the district court in which the suit is pending or is to be brought and have an
original or certified copy made and served by registered or certified mail on the
opposing party. After such service, any settlement, compromise, discontinuance,
or other disposition made of the suit or claim by either the attorney or the client
without the written consent of the other is null and void and the suit or claim
shall be proceeded with as if no such settlement or discontinuance had been made.
78. 295 So. 2d 868 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
79. 368 So. 2d at 470.
80. See note 73, supra.
81. 368 So. 2d at 471.
82. 364 So. 2d 1321 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
83. See note 77, supra.
84. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2291 provides:
The judicial confession is the declaration which the party, or his special attor-
ney in fact, makes in a judicial proceeding.
It amounts to full proof against him who has made it.
It can not be divided against him.
It can not be revoked, unless it be proved to have been made through an error
in fact.
It can not be revoked on a pretense of an error in law.
85. 364 So. 2d at 1325.
86. Id.
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The fourth circuit also decided that a widow may contract with
an attorney to recover damages for the wrongful death of her hus-
band on behalf of her children. In Southern Shipbuilding Corp. v.
Richardson87 the mother had contended that, because she had not
been judicially declared the tutrix of her minor children, she could
not contract on their behalf. The court disagreed, ruling that the
mother's obligation to conserve the minor's estate until a tutor is ap-
proved-including retaining an attorney to recover damages due the
children-should prevail over the technical requirements of the
Code of Civil Procedure,88 except in cases of clear abuse. The court
also found that the widow had ratified the contract by accepting the
benefits of the services provided by the attorney. In response to
her claim that the contract was so vague as to not represent a meet-
ing of the minds, the court found under the evidence that she under-
stood what the contract meant.
In Ragan v. Scullin" an attorney was found liable for the pay-
ment of experts who worked on his behalf in preparation for litiga-
tion because he, not the firm he had asked to do the "legwork," had
obligated himself to advance the money. The attorney had been in
contact with the experts and with the second law firm and had thus
obligated himself.2
Collecting the fee can be a problem for many attorneys. In LeNy
v. Friedman,3 one law firm found a solution, and the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal upheld it, although the court did term it a "bizarre
billing practice and one hardly to be recommended to other mem-
bers of the Bar."'" Two attorneys had a client of a number of years
sign a consent judgment for their fee. The court ruled that a person
signing a written document is presumed to know its contents. The
procedure was not an "ill practice" prohibited by the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility because the client failed to show that it vio-
lated "the Canons as applied to her."'5 The court found that she
knew what she was doing when she signed the document, so she
could not be harmed by its effects."
87. 363 So. 2d 1329 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
88. 363 So. 2d at 1332, citing LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 4061 & 4171.
89. 363 So. 2d at 1332-33.
90. Id. at 1333.
91. 368 So. 2d 196 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979).
92. Id at 198.
93. 372 So. 2d 721 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
94. Id. at 724.
95. Id (Emphasis in original.)
96. Id
[Vol. 40
1980] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1978-1979 741
MALPRACTICE
There were only two attorney malpractice suits decided by cir-
cuit courts in 1978 and 1979. In the first, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeal ruled in Johnson v. Daye9l that a petition alleging malprac-
tice filed against an attorney may state a claim both ex delicto and
ex contractu, even though the petition may read like one sounding
only in tort. Prescription on the claim, therefore, may be based on
the contractual action, which would not prescribe for ten years. 8
The third circuit also reprimanded Concordia Parish in a foot-
note for requiring a litigant to request that a court reporter record
the testimony and further asking that a $25 appearance fee be paid.
All court testimony should be recorded, the court noted. The trial
court and police jury of the individual parishes should make the
necessary arrangements."
In the second suit, the first circuit in Keller v. LeBlanc'" agreed
with the jury finding in the trial court that there had been no attor-
ney-client relationship under the facts of the case. And, without an
attorney-client relationship, there can be no malpractice."1
97. 363 So. 2d 940 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
98. Id. at 941, citing LA. CIv. CODE art. 3544.
99. 363 So. 2d at 941 n.1.
100. 368 So. 2d 193 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979).
101. Id. at 194.
